This paper studies congestion management based on congestion pricing as may be done by an Independent System Operator. Four main concepts are discussed: congestion pricing can lead to the same solution as an Optimal Power Flow, pricing need not have cost information available, good estimates of nonlinear cost coefficients are necessary, and pricing for congestion management is separable from pricing for the purpose of transmission network revenue reconciliation. Emph* sis is on the determination of sufficient information by observation of the behavior of the market to permit o p timum pricing without explicit communication among parties, and without generators ever being explicitly concerned about the relief of flow congestion. Results from simulated experiments are presented.
Introduction
The control of electric power grids is about to undergo a major paradigm shift [5] , to which this paper contributes by studying price signals as a means to manage congestion in a power system. Price signals for congation management are not new. They are part of California's plan for unbundled system operation, although it remains a politically charged issue [SI. Congestion pricing is based on concepts from [4] . Two other means for congestion management are quantity-curtailing (used by the National Grid Company [SI), and mandated CDordinated trades [9] .
Reference [SI concluded that the effectiveness of pricing is questionable because of "gaming" opportunities it affords. This conclusion pertained to the use of congestion pricing as a means for revenue generation in connection with transmission investments. This paper explores pricing only as a congestion managemeat tool, not its role for transmission system revenue generation.
For the sake of explaining the principle, a lossless network is considered. Only constraints associated with a base case are taken into consideration (i.e., no %on-0-7803-3713-1/97 $10.00 0 1997 IEEE
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Madison, Wisconsin, USA alvaradoQengr. wisc.edu tingency constraints"). When congestion occurs, it is relieved entirely by rescheduling of generation, Other means for congestion relief (such as opening of overloaded lines or load shedding) are not explicitly considered. Implicit in this assumption is that price signals are only sent to generators: loads remain inelastic, even though [7] has described the important effect that demand elasticity can have on congestion management'. When price signals are sent to generators to relieve congestion, they are sent as additive (or possibly subtractive) marginal costs which must be paid by (to) the generators to (by) the grid. The effect of these signals is to alter the generation costs, and thus result (under the assumption of rational economic behavior) in a change in the generation dispatch pattern.
The central ideas of this paper are: 0 Based on estimates of quadratic cost coefficients around a market solution, operators responsible for congestion management can use price signals to the generators to manage Congestion [4] . 0 System operators need not know the marginal cost of suppliers. They can infer the required parameters from an observation of the market. , 0 The use of price for congestion relief is separable from its use for transmission revenue generation.
I
The quadratic component of the supply costs gives information on the rate of change of marginal costs. I
In other words, quadratic terms predict how marginal 1 costs change as production levels change. Quadratic COefficients have been used previously by several authors, including [3], who assume quadratic benefit functions 1 to design electricity tariffs. The present paper exploits 1 the assumed quadratic property of costs to determine congestion prices which relieve congestion optimally. Hogan [l] proposed the use of the ideas of [4] for the establishment of a market of tradeable capacity rights. A further elaboration of the idea has been presented in 121, where the capacity rights are not associated with ~ pairs of nodes but instead with the capacity of each individual line. The present work does not use capacity rights directly. Instead, congestion pricing is the primary means for congestion management. Markets on capacity of transmission become indirect: in anticipation of congestion, suppliers of power compete for the purchase or rights for use of resources in uncongested zones. All trading deals with power, albeit differentiated by location. Trading in transmission is implicit.
2 Congestion in a vertically organized utility A vertically Organized power system comprises generation, transmission and distribution, whereby all control functions are within the control of the energy management system. Generation is dispatched in order to achieve the most economic overall solution. In simple control centers, the main tool used for dispatch is economic dispatch control based on the knowledge of the marginal costs of production for each unit in the system. In a more sophisticated environment, the tool of choice is an optimal power flow, which, in addition to its role in minimizing production cost, provides the possibility of avoiding congestion in a minimum cost manner. Congestion management, in this sense, means that a generation pattern is determined such that flow limits are not exceeded. The presence of constraints generally leads to higher marginal costs and reduced revenues. These higher marginal costs and reduced revenues act as an economic signal to the utility. The signal can be used to rearrange generation (for example, to commit or start different units). A persistent congestion problem is an indication to install new generation at certain locations, or to build additional transmission facilities.
Unbundled operation
Assume that the operation of a power system is unbundled, i.e. generation, transmission, distribution and system control are separate entities in terms of ownership and management. Several options to manage and operate unbundled systems exist [lo] . These options vary from ' Two premises of the IS0 concept as used in this paper are: (1) The I S 0 need not know prices to perform its function and (2) the IS0 imposes and adjusts a p propriate congestion charges to attain its objective of assuring coordination among transactions.
Although the IS0 need not know the final marginal cost at which the market settles, the IS0 assumes that all transactions are agreed upon at equal incremental costs. However, since the IS0 is required to coordinate the various transactions, this means that the IS0 must be privy to actual and proposed transactions in order that they can be-checked for feasibility and security. 37
The IS0 then determines any charges for transmission services (losses, reactive power, reserves, and other network services2). The present paper deals with the use of pricing to relitwe congestion under unbundled operation, as shown below. This paper assumes that congestion cannot be alleviated by these means (or rather, that any cost-free means for congestion control have already been exercised).
Not-cost-free means for congestion relief include: Redispatch of generation in a manner different from the natural settling point of the market. That is, some generatoni back down while others increase their output. The effect of this is that generators no longer operate at equal incremental costs. Curtailment of lloads and the exercise of (not-costfree) load interruption options. This paper restricts its attention to the case where the entire responsibility for congestion relief is on the generation (or supply) side. However, the ideas of this paper can be readily extended to the case where demands can participate in this effort [7] .
Congestion inevitably results in an economic surplus loss, irrespective of pricing policies. If the surplus loss is absorbed by the generators (because of fixed demand price policies or because of reluctance to curtail load), the consequence of congestion is higher total production costs, just as in the case of a vertically organized system. However, iunlike the vertically organized system case, in the unbundled concept the question arises as to the handling )of the extra cost. One approach is to include the extra cost in the charges for transmission services and use signals to power producers having the character of costs to rearrange the power injections such that the congestion is avoided.
Cost signals alter the marginal cost seen by parties. Thus, the market settles into a new equilibrium, presumably arrived at Iby equalizing the original marginal costs after the constraint cost adder is imposed. This comes about when consumers (or the pool) choose a different generating pattern to minimize costs, and such a pattern happens to (avoid the congestion. '5 5 The role of the OPF and corrective signals If all costa are correctly and explicitly disclosed and all constraints enforced, then an Optimum Power Flow (OPF) [14] would indeed find an optimal solution point that meets all constraints*. However, in a deregulated environment costs are not explicitly disclosed, at best they are indirectly revealed by the bidding patterns of the participants. As a preamble to the next section, this section assumes that a set of "true marginal costs" exists, and that these costs have been revealed to the operator (possibly in the form of bids). The operator "manages" the system by issuing orders to change dispatch patterns.
Consider a system with ng generators. Let the cost of generator i be:
Optimality is determined by defining a Lagrangian and finding its derivative with respect to all the variables:
where PD represents total system demand and equa- 
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The marginal production costs are no longer equal, even without losses. However, dispatch of power according to these equations leads to a least cost dispatch.
Additive prices can be determined such that, if the problem is re-optimized agnorrng all constmrnts, the constrained optimal solution is obtained. The determination of a set of (non-unique) values for this additive price vector @ is:
where P' is the solution of the (constrained) optimum power flow with full knowledge of costs. Application of these adder terms p leads to the solution of a new unconstmrned problem with linear cost terms b + p:
This solution has the property that Po = P'.
Thus, the following procedure can be used by an IS0
that is fully knowledgeable of costs to relieve congestion and attain optimality by pricing: 1 Solve an OPF problem.
2 If constraints result, determine prices /3 that can be sent to the market to relieve the congestion. 3 Issue these prices and observe the market response.
If all assumptions made by the IS0 are correct, the resulLing operating point should not violate any constraints, and should be a minimum cost solution. In other words, if appropriate additive prices p are communicated to the power producers and they follow their economic objective, the free market operating point will be identical to the constrained OPF, i.e. a generation pat tern without congestion.
I
A corollary from this section is that any purely additive cost applied equally to all producers does not have any effect on the ultimate equilibrium point (ignoring demand elasticity as stipulated earlier). themselves are unknown to the ISO. The IS0 is only able to observe the actual or proposed behavior of the various interacting parties, and must take action based on this behavior. On first thought it may appear that I this is not a solvable problem: after all, how is the IS0 going to issue prices to elicit behavior change if hejshe does not have prices or price information? This section shows that this is indeed possible, albeit it requires at least one iteration between the supplier's bids and the IS0 proposed transmission charges.
As indicated above, there is a simple congestion pricing strategy which allows the IS0 to interact successfully with the power producers, provided the IS0 knows the true costs: run an OPF based on the assumed cost curves, and issue additive prices , L3 so that the new equilibrium point occurs "naturally." If the IS0 assump tions about the linear cost terms are incorrect, this has no effect on the proposed congestion prices. However, , when the IS0 does not know the quadratic coefficients around the unconstrained flow pattern this approach , will not yield the desired result. Four (not mutually exclusive) approaches to the estimation of the quadratic cast coefficients of the generators suggest themselves:
The operator can require that, although costs need not be revealed, the manner in which costs vary must be revealed. This i s undesirable in a competitive environment + 0 The IS0 can issue him/herself appropriate supplementary quadratic cost components to all producers, consistent with marginal losses. This will likely be necessary, but insufficient. 0 Over time, by observing the behavior of generators under a variety of conditions, the I S 0 infers quadratic coefficient values for all generators. As explained b e low, this approach is almost (but not quite) sufficient.
0 The IS0 uses observed responses to transmission congestion charges to estimate the coefficients. This paper considers further only the third and fourth approaches above. Let bi and ci be the true linear and quadratic cost coefficients for generator i. These numbers are unknown to the ISO, but they dictate the behavior of the market. In the absence of price modifiers, the market will settle at an operating point where:
b + diag(c) . Po = ones(ng, 1) . XO As conditions change, the generation patterns will change, and so will A. However, it is assumed that the cost coefficients remain constant. Thus, a second uncongested operating conditions leads to:
Subtracting these last two sets of equations from each other leads to the following equation: diag(c) . A P = AA. ones(ng, 1) Based on the fact that changes in generation pattern A P must be according to the ratios of values of c, the IS0 can now estimate c values based on observation of AP., Denote these estimates as E. One 2i coefficient must be guessed, since it is only the ratio among values that can be observed at this point. Without lose of generality, assume that this is the coefficient for generator 1. The remaining coefficients are estimated from:
A potential problem occurs when APi = 0. However, under these circumstances it must be assumed that the particular generator is either unable or unwilling to participate in redispatch, and it must be thus excluded from the list of participating generators and treated as a constant output unit, therefore reducing the dimensionality of the problem'. It can be seen further that, if AX were known, the values for c' would be known accurately. As it is, these values become known up to a constant. That is:
where K is a scalar, and c and Z are vectors.
SThe ability of units to adjust their output offers a distinct and measurable economic benefit to the system. Units with fired output M unable to contribute to this benefit. However, the quantification of the economic benefit offered by unit. abk to adjust their output i. beyond the scope of thu paper.
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This process of "almost" estimating the quadratic CD- ' efficients by a passive observation of market behavior can be repeated as often as desired, leading to redundant solutions for the estimated values of 1. The determination of T: under these circumstances becomes a least squares problem.
The IS0 needs also an estimate for the linear cost c e efficients b. Denote these estimates by b. These coefficients have an arbitrary adder component, as described above. By assuming an arbitrary X and inserting the observed P,'s in the optimality condition of the unconstrained problem, the IS0 receives a set of b consistent with T:. With both these values, the IS0 is able to determine corrective price signals as follows.
Assume the I S 0 detects a single or multiple congestion condition P3 as a result of some outage, anticipated outage, change in demand, or change in proposed generation pattern. An OPF solution, as in the previous section, using a best estimate for the values of c leads to an optimal solution @, which differs from P3. Extension of this method to a nonlinear case involves the use of linearizations around an operating point. Variablea P are replaced by A P , PD is replaced with zero, and the vector b becomes a11 zerus.
An extension of the method to a lossy case would have to comprise two items. First, a loss allocation to the various transactions has to be made, which is PO& sible in principle but which is not treated here. Second, penalty factors applicable to each generator have to be Read all cost, network and constraint information. Solve a constrained OPF problem. De- termine the values of optima1 congestion price adders and verify that the unconstrained solution with these adders is the same. Observe the market under two different unconstrained operating conditions, P' and P2.
Step 0 (reference):
Step 1 (market): The experiment begins here.
Step 2 (ISO): Guess E l , determine S 2 , . . . , Ens.
Step 3 (ISO): When congestion is detected at P3, solve an OPF problem (solution g) and determine additive costs 0 (nodal transmission congestion prices).
Step 4 (market): Issue these prices and allow the market settle into a new operating point P4.
Step 5 (EO): By observing changes in behavior due to changes in prices, estimate K, solve the OPF (solution g E ) and determine new congestion prices p' .
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Step 6 (market): Issue congestion prices p* and allow the market to settle into condition P5 (= P*).
The system used is the 14 bus 7 generator system illustrated in Figure 1 . The results are listed in table 1 and all necessary data to reproduce these results are listed in tables 2, 3 and 4.
The method has also been applied to the 3-bus example in [9] (the same solution is obtained), and, as an incremental method, to a case based on the IEEE 300 bus test system6 and to a 1390 bus system with 158 generators and 36 simultaneously congested lines. 8 Economic aspects of the corrective signals Congestion can be managed by nodal prices, where these prices lead to an optimum if all parties behave rationally. However, the value of the congestion adder has still one degree of freedom: any number can be added to all prices and its effect on congestion relief is the same. Two other aspects of congestion that have not been explicitly addressed 50 far include: the need to use congestion as an economic signal for the need to network expansion, and the handling of contingency constraints in a cost-optimal manner (i.e., a manner that considers the ex-ante expected costs of potential outages). Both these subjects are beyond the main scope of the paper, but brief comments are in order.
Consider the effect of congestion prices on generators. The present paper has sidestepped the issue of revenue generation by congestion pricing by making it possible to have zero-revenue congestion-relieving prices. That is, under congestion some producers benefit while others do not. A producer contemplating the startup of a unit and the submittal of a bid (or even the construction of a unit) must analyze the expected total levels of production of his/her unit and anticipated prices of the ~ market (including payments or income from anticipated congestion) as part of a decision to bid. This analysis must consider ez-ante any risks associated with market, and/or congestion uncertainties.
Consider now the effect of congestion on transmission providers. Since transmission providers are monopolistic, they stand to benefit from congestion pricing unless either (1) they are carefully regulated or (2) they I are regulated indirectly, by a mechanism that lines up their self-interest with society's interest in lowest cost ' power production and delivery. This second idea is akin to performance-based regulation. Higher prices during congestion conditions may be desirable to give signah to the loads for reduced congestion. However, if the' result is higher revenues for the transmission company during these conditions, the incentive will be there for congestion to remain. This is of particular concern,, since for most other commodities congestion leads to a reduction in consumption and the desire for expan-) sion: a company has the incentive to expand capacity to sell more when congestion is reached (and prices are1 stable). In the case of the transmission company, the case is different: the total power transmitted remains *Available from f t p ://wahoo. ea .washington. a d d .
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exuctly the same (ignoring the small increase in power due to likely higher losses).
On the subject of ex-ante contingency constraints, the issue is that constraints must not be considered rigid, but they must be weighted against the cost of possible outages that failure to consider a particular constraint must result in. Thus, consideration of contingency constraints based on explicit determination of expected outage costs [IS] remains appropriate. 9 Observations on practicality This paper has assumed that market participants are perfectly rational and able to properly and accurately respond to price signals within appropriate time frames. The envisioned scheme uses prices to manage congestion only when markets have time to adjust to these prices. The exact mechanism by which a security coordinator interacts with the market can take many specific forms. One possibility is intervention into the forward market with price signals that are posted for all to use during their trade decisions, with the understanding that these signals, along with the bids, are subject to adjustments following rules similar to those by which the participants are allowed to adjust their bids and trades.
Another practical concern is that even well intentioned players able to respond may fail to react in a predictable, consistent and timely manner in every case. There are considerations other than price that determine the actual behavior of suppliers. The proposals in this paper can (and probably should) be coupled with other means for congestion management that do not rely on market response for congestion relief for more precise congestion relief under such circumstances.
The results of this paper are not dependent on the disclosure of generator costs. They rely instead on price observation to infer cost pammeters of suppliers. The approach as described requires "iteration" between s u p pliers and the ISO. As markets evolve, it is expected that markets that operate under the implicit threat of congestion prices soon learn to negotiate power levels and exchanges that avoid such conditions, and d e pend on geographically diversified power supply (and demand) portfolios instead.
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Linear characteristics (more precisely, constant prices over the whole range of the output of generators) are not compatible with corrective price signals. Hence, nonlinear characteristicvs are essential for pricing to work as described in the paper. This applies to coordinated trading [9] as well. The assumed quadratic price behavior is oine example which could be taken as an approximation to a nonlinear or a piecewise linear characteristic. Follow up work has addressed the issue of non-quadratic cost curves. Results illustrate that difficulties arise, but that there exist means to resolve them.
Small adjustment to congestion management pricing signals can be quite effective to manage congestion for units with marginal costs in the vicinity of system marginal costs. When congestion occurs which can only be relieved by units with very low or very high marginal costs, only significant congestion price adjustments will induce these units to respond. The effect is that s u p pliers with resources at strategic locations within the system will be able to derive significant revenues (or be expected to pay significant prices) during congek tion periods without skewing the system-wide marginal cost for uncongested regions'. Congestion pricing is thus seen as a practical alternative to capacity rights, whether these rightri are defined in a pair-wise manner The notions in this paper are not directly contradictory to capacity rights. They can, in fact, be used to help establish priicw for trading of capacity rights. However, the creation of markets that are differentiated in both time and location by means of congestion price signals simplifies trading by allowing the majority of all trading to focus on energy rather than on transmission capacity.
'It can be shown that a mix of supply units that includes nome low investment high margind coat low duty cycle units can be socially optimal. It is possible to use nodal congestion price signals to let power marketa attain a societally optimum operating point in the presence of congestion. The solution obtained is identical to that attainable by an Optimum Power Flow. Furthermore, the determination of these prices does not require that the IS0 know the actual costs of production of the various generators. The parameters needed (the quadratic coefficient of the cost curves) can be inferred from two passive observations of the market plus one observation of the response of the market to one round of congestion prices. This use of congestion prices is apart from its use as a means for revenue generation or from congestion pricing for er-ante probabilistic constraints, topics not addressed in this paper. 
